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FURTHER THOUGHTS ON CUSTOMARY

INTERNATIONAL LAW
Jack L. Goldsmith*
Eric A. Posner**
In two earlier articles, we used the tools of game theory to sketch a
positive theoretical account of customary international law ("CIL").' Our
theory rejected as question-begging the usual explanations of CIL based
on legality, morality, opinio juris, and related concepts. We argued instead that CIL emerges from nations' pursuit of self-interested policies
on the international stage. This approach, we argued, helps explain many
overlooked features of CIL, including how CIL originates and changes,
why the content of CIL tracks the interest of powerful nations, and why
nations change their views of CIL when their interests change. Finally,
we examined the practices associated with four supposedly well-settled
rules of CIL, and concluded that our theory better explained these practices than competing theories.
Both the theory and the case studies suggested that the behaviors associated with CIL evinced little real multilateral cooperation. Most
instances of supposed cooperation appeared to be examples of coercion
or coincidence of interest (which means that the behavior consistent with
the CIL norm is in the nation's self-interest regardless of other nations'
behaviors). We found a few examples of genuine cooperation, most notably in the context of diplomatic immunity, but argued that this
cooperation was best modeled as a series of embedded bilateral prisoners' dilemmas rather than as genuine multilateral cooperation. We
concluded that "CIL has real content, but it is much less robust than traditional scholars think, and it operates in a different fashion."2
Mark Chinen has written a thoughtful response to our prior articles,
and we are grateful for the opportunity to react to some of his arguments.

Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
Professor of Law, University of Chicago. Goldsmith thanks Russell Baker Scholars
Fund, and Posner thanks The Sarah Scaife Foundation Fund and The Lynde and Harry Bradley
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1. Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary InternationalLaw, 66
U. Cm. L. REV. 1113 (1999) [hereinafter Theory]; Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Understanding the Resemblance Between Modern and Traditional Customary International Law,
40 VA. J. INT'L L. 639 (2000) [hereinafter Modern and Traditional Customary International
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Law].
2.

Theory, supra, at 1177.
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1.Theory and Evidence
Our prior papers tried to set forth a positive account of CIL that was
theoretically robust and that accounted for the behaviors associated with
CIL. We considered and rejected a number of theories-including the
positivist theory that Chinen appears to endorse-and offered a theory
based on game theoretical principles. Our argument that CIL could not
be a "general and consistent practice of states followed from a sense of
legal obligation" 3 was based both on theory (multilateral cooperation of
this sort is possible only on the basis of extreme assumptions) and our
failure to find evidence of such cooperation even in case studies where
CIL norms were supposedly robust.
Chinen attacks certain elements of our theory, but says little about
the case studies. This is unfortunate, since the cases illustrate persistent
features of CIL that any theory of the subject must explain. These features include, but are not limited to: (a) a large number of purported
instances of nations following CIL "from a sense of legal obligation" are
actually cases of "coincidence of interest" or coercion; (b) numerous
deviations from purported CIL norms, and very little "general and consistent state practice"; (c) nations mouthing adherence to CIL norms
when it is in their interest to do so, but "reinterpreting" CIL and acting
contrary to it when circumstances change and it becomes in their interest
do so; and (d) the fact that CIL changes over time almost always tracks
the interests of powerful nations.
One problem with traditional theories of CIL is that they do not, and
indeed do not even try to, account for these and many other details of the
actual practice of nations associated with CIL. (This is too bad, since
there is an enormous and well-documented historical database of the
behaviors associated CIL, and because we will never truly understand
CIL unless we try to match theory to evidence.) Chinen's paper suffers
from this failure to tie theory to reality. We believe that Chinen must do
two things to refute our view. He must first develop a satisfactory theory
that shows that if nations are, as he says, "strong reciprocators," then
they would act in a manner that is consistent with traditional understandings of CIL. (More on this in point 4 below.) Then he must show that the
theory makes sense of the evidence-and we mean evidence of national
behavior, not the writings of international law professors. He has done
neither of these things.

3.

Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, § 102 cmt. J (1987).
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2. Description Versus Evaluation
Chinen argues that even if our descriptive theory of CIL is valid, CIL
might nonetheless play an "evaluative" role.4 Because CIL is used in an
evaluative manner, Chinen appears to conclude that our positive theory
cannot be valid. As he says, "[o]ne would expect some correspondence
between description and evaluation, if for no other reason than that if
legal evaluations could not possibly be mapped on to common perceptions of how the world is, their legitimacy would be in serious question."'
One problem with this argument is that Chinen says little about how
CIL is used as an evaluative tool. He appears to be talking about the
rhetoric of CIL-the fact that CIL is frequently invoked as a basis for
judging and criticizing state action. And he appears to believe that there
would be no basis for invoking CIL in this manner unless CIL itself possessed "legitimacy" that provided the rhetoric with bite.
If this is the argument, it suffers once again from its failure to consider the empirical evidence. Chinen is right to suggest that nations
frequently accuse other nations of violating CIL to discredit them. But
the rhetoric of CIL is much richer than this. For while nations accuse
others of violating CIL, they always argue that their actions are consistent with CIL, no matter how transparently self-interested the actions in
fact are. Their justifications under CIL conform to their interests; and
when interests change rapidly, so do the CIL rationalizations.6
As we have explained elsewhere, there are straightforward game
theoretical explanations for these rhetorical patterns that do not depend
on the normative gravitational pull of CIL.' The rhetoric of CIL can convey meaningful information about focal points when nations face a
coordination problem. This is arguably what explains, for example, the
success of Truman's famous proclamation about control over resources
in the continental shelf. Or the rhetoric of CIL can be viewed as a pooling equilibrium in which all nations avoid the inference that they are
unreliable cooperators by mouthing adherence to CIL. This makes sense
of Hitler's insistence that his invasions of Austria, Czechoslovakia, and
Poland were legal under international law even though he had no desire
to comply with that law. These and related explanations for the rhetoric
of CIL are consistent with our positive theory of CIL, and have nothing
4. Mark A. Chinen, Game Theory and Customary International Law: A Response to
Professors Goldsmith and Posner, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 143 (2001), Section II, especially
155-56.
5. Id.at 156.
6. For the basis of these claims, see Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner, Moral and Legal
Rhetoric in International Relations: A Rational Choice Perspective, 31 J. LEG. STUDIES
(forthcoming 2002).
7. Id.
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to do with the traditional positivist account. If Chinen wants to refute our
theory by reference to the evaluative role of CIL, his counter-theory must
once again be consistent with the evidence, including the evidence that
nations employ CIL rhetoric strategically.
We have an additional comment on Chinen's claims concerning the
relationship between descriptive and normative theory. Chinen argues
that the "standard account" of CIL is consistent with our claim that the
behaviors associated with CIL are best explained as coercion, coincidence of interest, or a series of bilateral prisoners' dilemma. He argues:
As long as most states refrained from [attacking other states'
coastal fishing vessels], it is plausible to find as a legal matter
that the behavioral regularity is general and consistent. As long
as there is a practice, it should not matter why it is followed...
and nothing in the standard account of customary international
law requires otherwise.'
But of course the standard account does require otherwise. It requires that the behavioral regularities be followed from a sense of
obligation. Under the standard account, this motivational component
("why it is followed") is crucial, for it is what separates CIL from
"mere" comity or accident. In making his point, Chinen purports to be
setting aside this "important question of opinio juris" in order to show
that CIL need not have a unitary logic. But this is nonsensical under the
standard account, for the unitary logic is precisely that the behaviors associated with CIL are followed from a sense of legal obligation. If our
account of CIL is correct, the motivational element of the traditional theory-opinio juris-drops out as irrelevant. Chinen's focus on the
behavioral side of the standard theory alone, without a harmonized defense of opiniojurisas well, cannot save the traditional account.
Finally, Chinen says that our view that CIL "lack[s] normative force
in and of [itself]," leads one to "wonder what this means about the status
of international law."9 He also suggests that our work "attack[s]" and
"threaten[s]" CIL and international law. It is true that our prior articles
do not seek to achieve "the establishment of international order and justice under the rule of law," as David Bederman has suggested all
"sincere" international law scholarship must.' Nor do we see our "pedagogic practice as persuasion and defense of international public order,"
as David Kennedy claims is true of professors who teach international

8. Chinen, supra note 4, at 178.
9. Id. at 157.
10. David Bederman, I Hate InternationalLaw Scholarship (Sort of), I CHI. J. INT'L L.
75 (2000).
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law." But we did not intend to question CIL's "status" (whatever that
means), or to attack or threaten CIL. Rather, we simply sought to understand how CIL works, and in doing so we argued that our theory rather
than the positivist theory was more coherent and better explained the
evidence. Chinen's characterization of our work as an attack on the
status of CIL itself might rest on a mistaken identification of international law with the positivist theory of international law. Or it might be
grounded in the international lawyer's typical a priori commitment to
international law as a powerful normative tool for influencing international behavior and achieving world justice. In any event, it is a
characterization that we do not share.
3. CIL and Treaties
Chinen observes that the texts of 40,000 treaties are deposited at the
United Nations, and seems to argue that the existence of so many treaties
shows that states can cooperate, and if states can cooperate through treaties, then they can cooperate through CIL. Further, he points out that CIL
emerges from treaties and also underlies them; thus, the existence of so
many treaties implies the robustness of CIL as a supplementary device
for international cooperation.
There are many things wrong with this argument. We start with the
purely rhetorical appeal to the number of treaties. The number 40,000 is
large but must be placed in context. If each of 190 states entered just two
treaties-say, an extradition treaty and a treaty of amity-with every
other state, this would amount to about 36,000 treaties. And yet all of
these treaties would be bilateral treaties that might (at best) reflect genuine bilateral cooperation but would say nothing about multilateral
cooperation. We do not suggest that this explanation accounts for 36,000
of the 40,000 treaties; it does not. But we do suspect that many (and
probably the large majority) of these treaties-ones that govern bilateral
relations, ones that aren't enforced, ones that express mere aspirations or
don't demand real sacrifice--don't even purport to reflect multilateral
cooperation."
Even if many of these treaties did remove barriers to cooperation, it
does not follow that they reflected meaningful cooperation. One must
ask, compared to what? There could be millions of opportunities for cooperation, with the treaties covering only a small fraction of low-value
cases. Would we nonetheless conclude that the treaties manifest robust
11. David Kennedy, A New World Order: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow, 4 TRANSNAT'L
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 329, 335 (1994).

12. Compare George Downs et al., Is the Good News About Compliance Good News
About Cooperation?,50 INT'L ORG. 379, 380 (1996) (making similar point).
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cooperation; or would we conclude instead that the treaties manifest a
small rate of cooperation. These questions are, we think, unanswerable.
The point is that the number of treaties, or their growth rate, tell us little
about the existence of international cooperation. However, they might
tell us, if we studied their terms and tried to observe their effect on national behavior, whether states are more likely to pursue their ends
through the use of treaties, as opposed to other devices.
Chinen might mean to argue that the existence of treaties shows that
it is possible for states to cooperate. If this is what he means, we do not
disagree. Indeed, we have argued, using standard points from the institutionalist literature, that treaties might facilitate cooperation even if they
are viewed as emerging endogenously from the rational behavior of
states."3 But even though we agree to this extent, we still do not understand why Chinen thinks the existence of a large-really an arbitrarynumber of treaties casts doubt on our claims about CIL.
Finally, we are puzzled by Chinen's argument about the interaction
of CIL and treaties. It is true that treaties often grow out of CIL, and it is
also true that much of what we today call CIL-especially the CIL of
human rights-is based on treaties. We do not see why this indicates
anything about the nature of CIL. Indeed, these facts about the relationship between treaties and CIL are perfectly consistent with our theory of
CIL. If, as we believe, the CIL of diplomatic immunity is best conceptualized as a mix of coercion, coincidence of interest, and a solution to a
bilateral prisoner's dilemma, it is nonetheless easy to imagine the practices that constitute this CIL to be used as a basis for a multilateral treaty
of diplomatic immunity. And if, as we believe, the CIL of human rights
sometimes reflects cooperation but more often reflects coincidence of
interest and coercion, there is no reason why the rhetoric of CIL associated with such behaviors could not draw on human rights treaties.
4. Individuals Versus States
Chinen points out that experimental games and common experience
indicate that people do not act in as self-regarding a way as game theory
ordinarily assumes. People share surpluses when the rules of the game
permit them to take them; people retaliate against cheaters even when
they expect to gain nothing by doing so. Models from evolutionary biology show that populations can in equilibrium contain other-regarding
members as well as self-regarding members. Chinen concludes that
some individuals are "reciprocators," that is, they will not try to cheat
people who cooperate with them, and they will retaliate against people
who cheat them; and that other individuals might use "other types of
13. See Theory, supra note I, at 1170-72.
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other-regarding strategies, including ones at higher levels of sophisticaand
tion, that would begin to share
4 features normally associated with law
a sense of legal obligation."'
We agree that not all individuals are purely self-regarding, but we do
not see how this proposition can be an explanation for CIL. There are
many reasons why individuals would be less self-regarding than nations.
They are less self-sufficient than nations, and socialization is thus more
central to individual than national survival. Similarly, individual action
takes place in a much denser institutional environment than national action, and norms among individuals tend to be clearer and more readily
enforced than those among nations. In addition, even if nations were led
by leaders who were strong reciprocators, the leaders usually have powerful countervailing reasons, grounded in the desire to continue in office,
to further the interests of their constituents regardless of their own predilections as a reciprocator on the international stage. For all of these
reasons, the fact that individuals are reciprocators might not apply to
nations in their dealings with one another.
And even if nations led by a "strong reciprocator" were more inclined to engage in acts of reciprocity, nothing about compliance with
CIL would follow, for there are many dimensions of reciprocity besides
CIL. Suppose that a "strong reciprocator" becomes the leader of a state
that has customary relationships with various other states. Chinen assumes that this leader would comply with existing CIL as long as other
states comply with them. But the leader might instead violate these
norms in order to satisfy his urge to reciprocate. He might decide, for
example, that he can best reciprocate the aid of an ally by repudiating
CIL norms that the ally finds irksome. In short, a leader's urge to reciprocate does not mean that he will only, or even usually, reciprocate with
respect to CIL.
5. Bilateral and Multilateral Prisoner's Dilemmas
Chinen argues that game theory permits multistate cooperation and
coordination under certain conditions, and that that these conditions prevail on the international stage. 5 Although we disagree with some of the
details of his analysis, we want to emphasize that we never argued that
multistate cooperation is impossible. Here, we must make a distinction
that Chinen elides, that between coordination games and PDs. We think

14. Chinen, supra note 4, at 184.
15. Id. at 167. Chinen mentions Axelrod, but Axelrod's tournament did not conform to
the ordinary assumptions of game theory. It was an example of evolutionary game theory, like
Peyton Young's, and we discuss them together below.
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that in some cases focal points permit states to solve n-player coordination games, and we gave examples in our earlier papers.16
We also agree that it is possible, given the assumptions of game theory, that states can solve n-player repeated PDs. Our prior work
emphasized bilateral PDs because we found implausible the claim that
n-player PDs could be solved in a decentralized way. Theory says that nplayer PDs can be solved (in the sense of high joint payoffs being
achieved), but only on the basis of strong assumptions under which the
solution takes place. States must adopt very tough strategies of retaliating against states that "cheat" and also against states that fail to retaliate
against states that cheat, and so forth. We do not observe such strategies
in the real world; indeed, as we explained in our prior work, we see
prominent examples of non-retaliation by third parties in the face of
clear violations of CIL. 7 Further, to overcome an n-player PD, states
must have tremendous information about the behavior of other states, so
that they can reliably distinguish moves that count as cheating and
moves that do not. And in the case of CIL, all of this must be done in a
decentralized way, without the benefit of much express negotiation and
agreement.
It is theoretically possible that these conditions can be met, but
unlikely. And in our view none of the standard examples of well-settled
CIL appear to satisfy these conditions or to otherwise evince the logic of
an n-player PD. We are happy to be refuted by evidence to the contrary.
Chinen, however, has provided none.
6. Evolutionary Game Theory
Chinen argues that evolutionary game theory might explain CIL. He
discusses Axelrod's tournament and the theories of the economist Peyton
Young. We agree that evolutionary game theory might provide insights
for understanding CIL, but we do not understand how this weakens the
arguments in our earlier papers.
The first problem is one that we have already mentioned: All the
theorizing in the world will not show that CIL reflects true multilateral
cooperation if the theory is not tied to the evidence-evidence that, in
our view, belies assertions of strong multilateral cooperation.
On the theory front, Chinen argues that evolutionary game theory
shows that cooperation among large groups of players is possible. This is
true in a narrow sense, but evolutionary game theory makes special assumptions that can be applied to international relations only with
difficulty. One such assumption is bounded rationality. Models in evolu16. See Theory, supra note 1, at 1130-31.

17. Id. at 1154-55.
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tionary game theory typically assume that players are boundedly rational: they mechanically imitate strategies that yielded the highest
payoffs in earlier rounds rather than choosing an optimal strategy based
on calculations of expected utility; and further, players have limited information and cannot rationally invest in order to acquire more
information.
At first sight, these assumptions seem attractive, especially in comparison to the assumptions of the rational actor model, which are clearly
false. Forced to choose between the assumptions that states are perfectly
rational and boundedly rational, most observers would choose the latter.
States are governed by human beings, and human beings are boundedly
rational.
The problem with this view is methodological: there is no standard
model of bounded rationality that one can use to guide empirical testing.
Indeed, evolutionary game theory typically does not take a position on
the degree of bounded rationality, and derives results that are the function of the decision procedures attributed to agents. Multilateral
cooperativeness, for example, becomes more stable as states become
more boundedly rational-that is, more imitative rather than calculating. 8 To propose a theory of CIL, however, one must take a position on
where states fall along this continuum. If national leaders are sufficiently
imitative and information constrained, cooperation becomes more likely.
But how do we decide whether they are, or not?
There are other problems with using evolutionary game theory to
guide empirical inquiry about CIL. The models typically assume a given
population of strategies (such as the well-known Tit for Tat) in a population: the models' results depend heavily on the kind of strategies, and
their proportions, in this population when the game "starts." But what
would it mean empirically to say that among the 190 existing national
states, Tit for Tat (at some initial stage) constituted X percent of the
population of existing strategies? What were the other existing strategies?
The models also make strong assumptions about the role of randomness: the correct amount of random error-not too much and not too
little-are necessary to support a favorable equilibria. But what would it
mean empirically to say that when a state decides on a move, it errs with
a probability of P?
Finally, the models are vague about the time period during which
events take place: they can generate, in Young's terminology, stochastically stable equilibria in which cooperativeness and conflict alternate
18. Jonathan Bendor and Piotr Swistak, The Evolutionary Stability of Cooperation, 91
AMER. POL. Sci. REV. 290 (1997).
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over very long periods. We could be in a stochastically stable equilibrium today, and yet not enjoy the gains of coordination, because the 20th
and 21 st centuries happen to correspond with a phase of transition, with
coordination finally being achieved in the 22nd century and thereafter.
Even if we could measure all of the variables on which the model depends, we might not be able to learn whether CIL exists until many
centuries pass. Try to get a NSF grant to conduct that empirical study.
Chinen also appeals to Young's story about driving customs. One
should initially observe that in this model players do not enter prisoner's
dilemmas. Rather, they play a coordination game. Thus, Young's model
provides no basis for holding that CIL permits the kind of cooperation
that overcomes prisoner's dilemmas. The theme of Young's work is that
repeated interaction over time can solve coordination games in a decentralized fashion-rather than through a central authority announcing the
focal point around which the players should coordinate. The boundedly
rational players imitate the moves of other players, but occasionally act
randomly. The fact that payoffs are higher when coordination is achieved
puts pressure in favor of coordination-and when there are multiple
equilibria, of higher value coordination. However, as Chinen points out,
Young's model permits players to jump out of value-maximizing
outcomes as well. It is only on average that parties achieve valuemaximizing coordination.
In the end, Young's model is just a more complex version of our coordination theory of CIL. The additional complexity does not, in our
view, make international behavior any easier to understand, and thus parsimony counsels against it. It does not, unlike our theories, provide
direction for empirical research-or if it does, Chinen does not show
how. But what is most important to understand is that evolutionary game
theory does not do the work that Young wants it to do. It does not show
that CIL reflects multilateral cooperation, nor does it show-and we do
not understand how it could show-that CIL influences nations through
their sense of legal obligation.

